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THE POSTERITY PROJECT: DEVELOPING A 
METHOD FOR LONG-TERM POLITICAL REFORM 
EDWARD B. FOLEY∗ 
The primary obstacle to improving political processes in the United 
States is what Heather Gerken has succinctly called “the here to there” 
problem.1 Ideas abound for how to eliminate gerrymandering,2 for example, 
or modernize voter registration databases,3 but these ideas are difficult to 
implement because they face resistance from politicians whose short-term 
interests are to oppose them. Our existing political system, with its 
separation of powers and checks and balances, is famous for imposing 
hurdles designed to prevent one political party from enacting into law its 
particular vision of political reform just because it has captured a majority 
of seats in a single legislative chamber at any particular time. But as long as 
each of the two major political parties exercises an effective veto over the 
other’s reform agenda, and either is unwilling to compromise based on a 
calculation that it currently benefits from the status quo, then reform is 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer Professor for the Administration of Justice and the 
Rule of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. 
 This paper is based on a presentation given at the 2013 McAfee & Taft Oklahoma Law 
Review Symposium on Election Law, held at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, 
Norman, Oklahoma, on February 15, 2013. For discussions on this topic, I wish to especially 
thank Akhil Amar, Bruce Cain, Kathleen Clark, Josh Douglas, John Fortier, Heather Gerken, 
Steve Huefner, Mike Pitts, Nick Stephanopoulos, and Charles Stewart. 
 1. Heather K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 33, 33 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 
YALE L.J. 1808 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., S.B. 37, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); see also PEW CTR. ON 
THE STATES, INACCURATE, COSTLY, AND INEFFICIENT: EVIDENCE THAT AMERICA’S VOTER 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM NEEDS AN UPGRADE (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.pewstates. 
org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Upgrading_Voter_Registration.pdf. 
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impossible—and this is true even when both parties would tacitly 
acknowledge that from the public’s perspective the existing political system 
contains defects in need of repair. 
Aware of this problem, the Progressive Era (a time when pursuit of the 
public interest briefly was able to transcend the existing two-party system) 
invented the ballot initiative, a procedural device by which the populace 
would be able to bypass the conventional legislative process and take the 
reins of government into its own hands.4 Theoretically, then, the people 
themselves should be able to use the ballot initiative to adopt a political 
reform proposal that they think desirable but which one political party 
blocks in the legislature.5 Yet this theory has not worked so well in practice. 
To be sure, sometimes use of the initiative in this way is successful, as 
when independent-minded Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California 
urged the state’s voters in 2008 to adopt the creation of a nonpartisan 
redistricting commission.6 But more often than not, such efforts fail because 
voters are skittish about adopting any initiative that receives vociferous 
opposition from either major party.7 For example, in Ohio, redistricting 
reform measures on the ballot in 2005 and 2012 were defeated both times 
because the Republican Party loudly opposed them, and associated groups 
spent ample money to scare voters away from the proposals.8 These defeats 
do not mean that Ohio voters favor gerrymandering. On the contrary, even 
in its opposition the Republican Party both times acknowledged the evil of 
gerrymandering; it argued, instead, that each reform proposal on the ballot 
was horribly flawed in its particular details and thus should be rejected in 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); see also DAVID D. 
SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 5-10 (1989). 
 5. See generally Tom Pryor, A More Perfect Union? Democracy in the Age of Ballot 
Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1549 (2013) (introducing a symposium issue addressing the 
relationship between the theory and practice of direct democracy in the United States today). 
 6. Jennifer Steinhauer, Plan on California Ballot for New Districting Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at A17. 
 7. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, only 45% of ballot 
initiatives were successful in the decade from 2000 to 2010, and in 2012 the percentage was 
even lower. 2012 Ballot Measures: Election Results, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot-measures-2012-
homepage.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). That national data supports the conventional 
wisdom that voters are more likely to vote “no” on a ballot initiative, especially one that has 
been subject to a large amount of negative campaign advertising. 
 8. Jim Siegel & Darrel Rowland, $16 Million Spent on Fight over Issue 2, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2012, at B1. 
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favor of an alternative solution to be developed later.9 But some key Ohio 
Republicans are in no particular hurry to adopt that alternative, as their 
party currently controls the legislative process in the state and would 
benefit from retaining the power to draw redistricting maps that favor its 
candidates.10 
Thus, whether because it lacks the education necessary to understand the 
issue of redistricting reform or otherwise, the citizenry has difficulty using 
the initiative process to adopt reform proposals that are strenuously opposed 
by sophisticated political elites. Moreover, the initiative process is not 
available for reforming federal rules that govern national politics. Only an 
amendment to the United States Constitution could change, for example, 
the antiquated and awkward requirement that the Vice President preside 
over the counting of electoral votes to choose the next President11—when 
the Vice President is often a presidential candidate (as Al Gore was in 2000, 
and Richard Nixon in 1960) and therefore has an inherent conflict of 
interest. Yet amending the Constitution is notoriously difficult and cannot 
be accomplished by means of a nationwide ballot initiative.12 Consequently, 
even when the American people strongly and persistently want to adopt a 
particular national reform, they lack a method by which to effectuate their 
will. To take the most glaring example of this fact, for a half-century the 
American people have wanted to replace the Electoral College with direct 
election to the presidency.13 Public opinions throughout this period have 
consistently reported this overwhelming popular sentiment, sometimes as 
high as 80% of those surveyed.14 Yet the Electoral College has not been 
replaced. Even if one personally favors its retention, all should agree that 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Joe Hallett, Bennett to Seek Top GOP Post in January, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 
1, 2012, at B1. 
 10. Andrew J. Tobias, Redistricting Reform Stalls, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 
2013, at B1. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 12. See id. art. V. 
 13. See Alexander Keyssar, It’s Time to Retire the Electoral College, COGNOSCENTI 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2012/11/06/electoral-college-alex-keyssar. 
 14. Id.; see also Gallup Polls: Consistent Super-Majority Support for National Popular 
Vote, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/electoral_college/Gallup_Polls.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2013). In Gallup’s most recent survey, conducted after the 2012 election, over 60% 
of Republicans, Democrats, and independents said that they would vote for a law that would 
“do away with the Electoral College and base the election of the president on the total vote 
throughout the nation.” Lydia Saad, Americans Call for Term Limits, End to Electoral 
College, GALLUP POLITICS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159881/americans-
call-term-limits-end-electoral-college.aspx. 
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the situation is one in which the American people have been systematically 
frustrated in the achievement of their own sustained preference. 
What is to be done? The only possible solution is to shift gears and adopt 
a long-term perspective. To invoke an idea that Professor Akhil Amar raises 
at the end of his new book,15 we should create a bipartisan mechanism 
whereby the nation’s contemporary political elites consider the pros and 
cons of potential political reforms, subject to the constraint that none of 
these proposals are to be implemented in the near term. Instead, if adopted, 
these proposals would become operative only in the long term—the very 
long term. Imagine a deliberative body whose reforms would take effect not 
immediately, or even in the following year, but instead far in the future, 
perhaps as long as a half-century later. The advantage of this approach, as 
Professor Amar explains, is that it would put the contemporary deliberators 
behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” whereby they are unable to make 
decisions to benefit their own self-interest, or even the interest of their own 
direct descendants as they cannot foresee the socioeconomic circumstances 
that their descendants will occupy.16 This “veil of ignorance” is the only 
feasible way to induce contemporary political elites to set aside self-interest 
and act impartially on behalf of the public as a whole. 
It might seem frustrating to have to wait fifty years to implement a 
reform that people today, if they set aside self-interest, would recognize as 
benefiting the public. But the basic point is that without the mechanism of 
long-term implementation delay, the reform will not be adopted at all. 
Waiting fifty years, then, is better than never. 
In any event, the idea is worth serious consideration. Thus, the purpose 
of this essay is to consider more systematically what Professor Amar only 
mentioned very briefly at the end of his book. 
I. The Idea of the Posterity Project 
Suppose Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, as our two most recent past 
Presidents, one from each of the two major parties, agreed to serve as co-
chairs of a new Posterity Project designed to develop a series of specific 
amendments to the United States Constitution. (If the Posterity Project did 
                                                                                                                 
 15. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 474-77 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 475 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). Current political 
decision makers cannot even anticipate whether their own great-grandchildren will win the 
genetic lottery, as the risks of birth defects and other development diseases, like autism, are 
unpredictable enough that there is as much a chance of one’s own family being afflicted by 
such misfortunes as there is that other families will be affected. 
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2013]        THE POSTERITY PROJECT 5 
 
 
not get started until after the end of the Obama presidency, then Bush and 
Obama could serve as the co-chairs as the two immediate past Presidents, 
each from opposite political parties.) Upon submission of the amendments 
by the Posterity Project, Congress would vote on these constitutional 
amendments and, if they receive the necessary two-thirds vote in each 
house, they would be sent immediately to the States for ratification soon 
thereafter by three-fourths of the legislatures.17 But a distinct feature of 
each constitutional amendment recommended by this Posterity Project and 
sent to the States by Congress would be an explicit provision that the 
amendment would not become effective until fifty years after formally 
becoming part of the Constitution upon ratification by the necessary three-
quarters of the States.18 
A. The Composition of the Project 
Who should serve on this Posterity Project and how should it be 
structured? I suggest making this body resemble the Electoral College: the 
same number of members from each state as the state has presidential 
electors, for a total of 538 (counting the three presidential electors from the 
District of Columbia). The advantage of this approach is that it starts with 
the status quo, and therefore any changes that this body recommends will 
not be seen as prompted by the design of the body itself. To be sure, one 
might say that this design for the body biases it in favor of the status quo 
and against change. But there is no entirely neutral way to design the body, 
and if its purpose is to recommend changes with the aim of its 
recommendations having some chance for consideration by existing 
institutions, then it is better to start with a design that reflects existing 
institutions in this way. By contrast, a recommendation to eliminate the 
Electoral College by an entity that was designed in such a way that did not 
reflect the existing role of the States in presidential elections would likely 
be “dead on arrival.” Conversely, a design that reflected the existing 
arrangement but called for its elimination in fifty years might have a chance 
of receiving more respectful consideration. 
It would be best if Congress appointed the 538 members of the Posterity 
Project’s deliberative assembly. That way, the Project would begin with 
Congress having already invested in the enterprise. Congress thus would be 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 18. Amending the United States Constitution with a provision that does not immediately 
take effect is not a new concept. See, e.g., id. amend. XX, § 5 (preventing part of the 
amendment from taking effect until “the 15th day of October following the [amendment’s] 
ratification”). 
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predisposed towards making it successful. But if not, the Posterity Project 
could get up and running on its own. As long as Presidents Clinton and 
Bush agreed to serve as co-chairs, they could jointly select the 538 
members based on recommendations from staff and nominations from the 
public. The resulting selections would be inherently bipartisan, given the 
different party affiliations of the two co-chairs. (The same would be true if 
Presidents Bush and Obama were co-chairs; only if the Posterity Project 
were started after a time in which the two most recent past Presidents were 
from the same party would it be necessary to reach further back to an ex-
President from the opposite party to serve as one of the two co-chairs.19) 
The goal should be to appoint leading figures from each of the states: 
scientists, clergy, business executives, scholars, doctors, journalists, and so 
forth. Even some respected attorneys and politicians would be appropriate 
candidates, although the body should not be dominated by professional 
politicians. Rather, a mix of political insiders and outsiders would make it 
more reflective of the public at large. 
But for this body, I would not recommend random selection from the 
entire public.20 There will be enough opportunity for the public as a whole 
to weigh in on the merits of whatever long-term reforms this body 
recommends, as its recommendations would need to be approved by two-
thirds of each house of Congress and three-fourths of the state legislatures 
before becoming officially adopted as constitutional amendments.21 Rather, 
membership in the Posterity Project’s deliberative assembly should be 
something of a meritocracy: the individuals appointed should be seen as 
worthy, based on their prior contributions to society, to participate in this 
process for making recommendations for the long-term improvement of our 
nation’s system of government. To be sure, appointments should be made 
in such a way that the overall composition of the body reflects multiple 
facets of American diversity—including gender, race, and religion—and 
not just the geographic representation of all fifty states. 
Because it is designed as an appointed rather than elected body, the 
Posterity Project’s deliberative assembly should be populated with 
thoughtful members regardless of their ability to run for office under 
contemporary conditions of campaign finance and practices. This advantage 
would allow the body to consider whether adjustments should be made to 
                                                                                                                 
 19. For example, had the Posterity Project started during the Clinton administration, 
Jimmy Carter would have been one of the two co-chairs along with George H.W. Bush. 
 20. But see Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 
139 (2013). 
 21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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the rules that govern campaign finance and practices, without regard to 
whether the members as a group personally benefit from the existing 
rules.22 True enough, this body would still need to convince Congress and 
the state legislatures of any proposed changes to these rules, and that might 
be a tall order even if the proposed changes would not take effect for fifty 
years. Nonetheless, for this project, it is better to start with a group of well-
respected public figures appointed for the task of making long-term 
recommendations, rather than electing delegates to the assembly using 
existing electoral procedures. But to give this appointed body the kind of 
public respect and stature it would need to be successful, it would be 
necessary that many of its members are well-known to the public and 
considered worthy of this enterprise. For example, one can imagine public 
figures like Colin Powell and Sandra Day O’Connor as the kind of 
candidates that are considered for this body. Moreover, a primary reason for 
making Presidents Clinton and Bush the co-chairs is their instantly 
recognized level of gravitas, as the nation’s two most recent ex-Presidents, 
and thus worthy of leading this endeavor to improve the long-term civic 
health of our country.23 
  
                                                                                                                 
 22. It is common knowledge, for example that some political figures and public 
intellectuals are more telegenic than others; a system of campaign spending that emphasizes 
thirty-second television spots obviously tends to favor these more telegenic individuals. 
Likewise, some individuals are simply better at making fundraising phone calls than others. 
Call it the “schmooze” factor, or whatever, but a regime that requires public leaders to make 
fundraising phone calls for four hours each day obviously favors those individuals with a 
special talent for this kind of fundraising activity. The key point then is to populate the 
Posterity Project with thoughtful individuals who will deliberate wisely about what long-
term constitutional reforms would benefit the nation, without regard to whether they would 
make successful political candidates in an era when electoral politics is dominated by the 
need to raise huge sums of money to spend on thirty-second television ads. 
 23. Some might worry that 540 members, counting the two co-chairs, might be too large 
a group to conduct thoughtful deliberations on future political reforms. But the experts who 
have developed the science and art of “deliberative polling,” including Professor James 
Fishkin (who initiated and developed this concept), maintain that high-quality deliberations 
can be conducted with up to 600 participants and, indeed, a group of this size permits the 
deliberative assembly to be more thoroughly representative of the polity as a whole 
(particularly when the polity itself is large, as the United States certainly is). See, e.g., Alice 
Siu, Deliberative Polling, PG EXCHANGE, http://www.pgexchange.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=132&Itemid=121 (click “How is it done?” tab) (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2013). 
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B. The Structure of the Project’s Deliberations 
For how long should the Posterity Project’s assembly deliberate before 
submitting recommendations to Congress? On this point, there is a tradeoff. 
On the one hand, it would be better if the assembly had ample time with 
which to educate itself about the issues on which reforms might be 
proposed. Many of the potential topics for consideration—such as 
gerrymandering, the use of the filibuster in the Senate, the role of primary 
elections in fostering polarization in Congress, the currently chaotic process 
of presidential primaries, and campaign finance regulation—would benefit 
from years of careful study. Indeed, one could even call the project’s 
assembly “the Posterity College” and think of its 538 members (plus two 
co-chairs) as receiving an extensive education on the issues relating to 
political reform before they undertake to decide what reforms to 
recommend. If time were not a scarce commodity, one could make 
membership in this Posterity College a full-time commitment for a year or 
even two.24 
On the other hand, however, time is a precious resource, and it might be 
unrealistic to expect the kind of dignitaries one would wish to serve in this 
body to commit full-time to this project for a year or more. Even though the 
goal of the Posterity Project is to improve American government for the 
sake of the future—and thus anyone asked to serve would be inclined to do 
so out of a basic sense of patriotism (the members of the Posterity College 
might be looked upon by future generations as the modern moral equivalent 
of the original Founding Fathers)—it would be prudent to contemplate a 
less demanding time commitment. Perhaps the Posterity College could meet 
for one weekend per month for a year, with the expectation that members 
would do their “homework” between meetings, and then, when the body is 
ready to debate and vote on specific proposals, it could meet full-time for 
two weeks. If these meetings are well organized, taking place in attractive 
resort-type locations around the country—maybe Miami Beach in January 
and Aspen in July, for example—the members would not consider service 
to be too onerous. Indeed, they might be willing to set aside the whole 
month of August for the final set of debate and votes on specific proposals 
if these deliberations occurred in a place like Cape Cod or northern 
Michigan. 
Should the Posterity College deliberate in secret or in public? The 
constitutional convention of 1787 in Philadelphia met behind closed doors, 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Congress or, if necessary, the philanthropic community could pay the members 
adequate compensation for serving full-time over an extended period. 
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and many attribute its success (at least in part) to its ability to deliberate 
with candor.25 Others also observe that the United States Supreme Court 
succeeds in part because of the privacy of its own deliberations and, more 
generally, that the increased demand for open meetings has the unfortunate 
effect of undercutting the ability of government officials to compromise and 
to explore constructive solutions to difficult problems.26 Nonetheless, 
current political culture makes it unrealistic to think that this body could 
operate entirely in secret. Instead, perhaps it would be possible for the 
Posterity College to have a series of both public and private sessions. Some 
of the earliest sessions, when the College’s members are first learning about 
the issues on which they will deliberate, would be ones most suitable to 
being conducted in public; that way, interested members of the public could 
join in the learning process and perhaps contribute their own ideas for the 
College’s consideration. But when it gets to the point where the College 
begins debating some specific proposals, perhaps it could go into a set of 
private sessions so that members feel free to express opinions without those 
opinions immediately becoming matters of public record. Yet when it 
comes time for the College to hold its final debates and votes on the 
recommendations it will adopt, it could reemerge into public view so that 
the public could hear the considered arguments for and against the items to 
be voted upon. Just as the Supreme Court releases written opinions after its 
private deliberations, so too the Posterity College could offer public reasons 
for its recommendations after the opportunity for some behind-closed-doors 
discussion of these matters. 
Should the Posterity College itself operate according to the principle of 
majority rule? Or, instead, should it take a supermajority of its members to 
adopt a formal recommendation to submit to Congress? This question is a 
difficult one. Arguably, majority rule is the most straightforward expression 
of democratic principles because a minority should not be entitled to defeat 
the considered judgment of a majority. But to become constitutional 
amendments, the Posterity College’s recommendations will need to receive 
approval of two-thirds of each house of Congress. Therefore, it makes sense 
to require any proposal to receive the same level of support from the 
Posterity College. Any measure that did not receive two-thirds support of 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See, e.g, RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN 83 (2009) (quoting James 
Madison’s subsequent reflection that “no Constitution would ever have been adopted by the 
convention if the debates had been public”). 
 26. Professor Bruce Cain, for one, makes this argument in a forthcoming book, to be 
published by Cambridge University Press. See BRUCE E. CAIN, FIXING AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY: THE QUANDARIES OF POLITICAL REFORM (forthcoming). 
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the Posterity College would be immediately suspicious upon its arrival in 
Congress. Moreover, as a deliberative assembly tasked with the 
responsibility for making recommendations on constitutional amendments 
that would take effect a half-century later, the Posterity College should 
strive for measures that receive much more of a consensus than merely bare 
majority support. While it would be unreasonable to expect unanimity in a 
body having a total of 540 members, counting its two co-chairs, it is not too 
much to ask that any of its specific recommendations receive the assent of 
two-thirds of its members. Thus, the affirmative vote of at least 360 
members should be required for the Posterity College to formally send a 
specific proposed constitutional amendment to Congress.27 
II. The Agenda of the Posterity Project 
Assuming that the Posterity College actually convened, what should be 
its agenda? It would be entitled to pursue any topic that concerns potential 
long-term constitutional reform; thus, its agenda cannot be identified 
completely in advance. Nonetheless, what follows is a list of topics that I 
would wish it to consider. 
A. Congressional Redistricting 
Instead of giving state governments the power to draw district lines for 
seats in the United States House of Representatives, the Constitution should 
be amended to put this power into the hands of a national nonpartisan 
redistricting commission. The specific details of the commission would be 
worked out during the Posterity College’s deliberations, but the essential 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Expressed this way, the numerical assent requirement would treat any absent or 
abstaining members as negative votes. Alternatively, the two-thirds rule could be expressed 
in terms of members present and voting, subject to a quorum requirement—for example, if 
360 members were necessary for a quorum, then 240 votes, or two-thirds of two-thirds, 
would be the minimum by which a proposal could be adopted by the body. I am inclined 
toward the stricter standard because all members should be expected to attend all meetings, 
and the whole point of the two-thirds requirement is to show the widespread support for any 
proposed recommendation. But I could likely be persuaded that two-thirds of the group that 
actually shows up to participate in the final debate and to vote is an adequate demonstration 
of consensus assuming that the quorum requirement is deemed strict enough. 
  If the quorum requirement were 75%, then two-thirds of a quorum would be 50% of 
the entire body. Therefore, one could adopt an “absolute majority” as the voting rule—in 
other words, a majority of all members, rather than just a majority of members present and 
voting—and achieve essentially the same effect as a two-thirds voting requirement coupled 
with a 75% quorum requirement. Still, I lean toward an “absolute two-thirds” voting 
requirement—in other words, two-thirds of the entire body—with no separate quorum rule. 
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idea would be to guarantee an equal number of commissioners from the two 
major political parties with at least one tie-breaking member in case the 
commission became mired in partisan deadlock. 
B. The Replacement of the Electoral College with Direct Election of the 
President by a National Popular Vote 
I would propose that a presidential candidate must win a majority of 
ballots cast nationwide in the quadrennial general election, and thus if the 
highest vote-getter does not reach a majority (but has only a plurality of the 
votes cast), then there would need to be a runoff between the top-two 
finishers. But instant-runoff voting is an alternative worth considering, as it 
avoids the necessity of voters showing up for a separate, later runoff—when 
turnout is likely to be lower.28 The Posterity College might reach the 
judgment that a half-century is enough time for the public to become 
sufficiently educated about how instant runoff voting works to become 
comfortable using it for presidential elections. 
Either way, the Posterity College would need to consider how a national 
popular vote for President would be administered. I favor creating a 
national nonpartisan election commission for this purpose. It could be the 
same commission that conducts congressional redistricting. It could 
piggyback on the conduct of election administration in the states, rather 
than setting up an entirely separate election administrative apparatus. In 
other words, it could rely on state and local officials to administer the 
casting and counting of ballots, and thus it would receive vote totals from 
the states to aggregate into a single national result. But it could set national 
standards for the proper administration of presidential (and congressional) 
elections—and could further require state and local officials to comply with 
those national standards or else be subject to replacement or other remedial 
measures. Furthermore, this national election commission could be 
empowered to conduct a recount of any presidential election, or runoff, that 
falls within a certain specified margin, as well as to resolve any ballot-
counting disputes raised by any presidential candidate. 
Thus, part of any proposed constitutional amendment to eliminate the 
Electoral College would also eliminate the current provisions of the Twelfth 
Amendment that call for the delivery of each state’s electoral votes to the 
Vice President to be opened and counted in a joint session of the Senate and 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See generally Michael Lewyn, Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting, 6 PHOENIX L. 
REV. 117 (2012); Brian P. Marron, One Person, One Vote, Several Elections?: Instant 
Runoff Voting and the Constitution, 28 VT. L. REV. 343 (2004). 
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House of Representatives.29 Instead, certified popular vote totals from each 
state would be sent to the national nonpartisan election commission, which 
would have the power to certify the national popular vote results and 
resolve any controversies pertaining thereto, and thus also have the 
attendant power to declare the official winner of the presidential election.30 
To avoid any confusion, the Constitution would have to also make clear 
that neither Congress nor the Judiciary has any authority to intervene with 
the nonpartisan commission in its determination of the winner of a 
presidential election. 
C. Presidential Primary Elections 
The Posterity College should also consider the way in which presidential 
candidates are nominated and thus qualify to appear on the ballot. Rather 
than the current process, in which states trip over themselves to hold earlier 
and earlier primaries and caucuses, the Constitution instead could empower 
the nonpartisan commission to set up a series of ten primary dates, with five 
states holding primaries on each date (perhaps one day each fortnight for an 
eighteen-week calendar from the first day of primary voting to the last). 
The states could be distributed among the ten dates in such a way that there 
is an appropriate regional balance on each date, and the sequencing of dates 
could be done to permit smaller states to come before larger ones, so that 
candidates have a chance to build support in smaller media markets before 
facing the challenges of competing before much larger audiences. The rules 
would need to be written in such a way that political parties were 
encouraged, but not required, to participate in this primary process; for 
example, participating parties could be guaranteed a spot on the general 
election ballot, whereas nonparticipating parties would need to meet some 
sort of signature requirement (or other measure of adequate support) in 
order for their candidates to appear on the ballot.31 
It would be necessary to consider, moreover, exactly what the vote-
counting rule should be to determine a winner of the primary process. 
Would it be simply a national plurality of votes cast for any candidate 
seeking a particular party’s nomination (with that candidate being 
                                                                                                                 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 30. The new constitutional provisions must also assure that the commission has enough 
time between the close of the polls and the inauguration of the new President to conduct any 
needed audit or other investigation of the returns to assure the nation of the accuracy and 
integrity of the results. 
 31. Independent candidates, unaffiliated with any party, would also need to satisfy a 
signature or comparable requirement. 
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designated as the party’s nominee on the general election ballot)? Or, 
instead, should there be some more complicated formula by which a 
candidate would receive bonus points for winning a certain number of 
states or congressional districts? I favor the simpler formula, as long as the 
schedule of presidential primaries is regionally balanced so that candidates 
have to compete in all states in order to win the most votes nationally. But 
reasonable arguments can be advanced for alternative formulas, and the 
Posterity College should be permitted to make whatever recommendation it 
thinks best, including leaving to the national nonpartisan election 
commission the authority to revise the voting rules for presidential 
primaries from time to time. 
Likewise, it would be necessary to consider exactly who gets to vote for 
a particular party’s candidates in a primary election. Do voters have to be 
members of the party?32 Or may independent voters, unaffiliated with any 
political party, choose which party’s primary they would like to participate 
in? Would voters in one party even be permitted to “cross over” and cast 
ballots in another party’s primary? Or, would they at least have to “de-
affiliate” from their prior party for the day? The Posterity College could be 
guided by the Supreme Court’s previous jurisprudence relating to these 
questions,33 although those judicial precedents would not bind the Posterity 
College because it would be considering a proposed constitutional 
amendment for the future. 
D. Congressional Primaries 
Though not involving the multi-state dynamics of the presidential 
primary process, congressional primaries raise some of the same issues as 
presidential primaries—for example, which voters get to participate in each 
party’s primary—and are worthy of the Posterity College’s consideration. 
Moreover, if the Posterity College proposed instant runoff voting for 
congressional elections, it would change the role that primary elections play 
in the overall electoral process. No longer would winning a party’s primary 
in a “safe” congressional district give a candidate reasonable assurance of 
winning the general election. Instead, the possibility would exist that a 
centrist candidate, who could not win the party’s primary, would be able to 
prevail in the instant runoff voting system.34 Although I hesitate to say that 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Furthermore, by what date must a voter be a member of the party? Would the date 
of the primary itself suffice? And by what standard would party membership be determined? 
 33. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589-98 (2005) (collecting cases). 
 34. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 303-04 (2011). 
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the Posterity College definitely should recommend instant runoff voting for 
congressional elections—the Posterity College instead should be open to 
various proposals designed to improve congressional elections—the current 
concerns about hyperpolarization in Congress and the evidence that the 
current primary process is a major contributing factor are reasons that some 
such reform measures should be high on the Posterity College’s agenda. 
E. An Explicitly Recognized Constitutional Right to Vote 
It is often observed that the United States Constitution does not expressly 
guarantee citizens the right to vote but instead only protects the franchise 
from certain specified forms of discrimination.35 Filling this gap need not 
be merely symbolic. Instead, the national nonpartisan election commission 
could be empowered to promulgate rules protecting each citizen’s right to 
vote.36 Indeed, the Constitution could specify that the polls must be open 
for an adequate amount of time to give each citizen a reasonable chance to 
cast a ballot, a provision which would go a long way to eliminating the 
exclusivity of voting only on a single Tuesday.37 The Constitution could 
also guarantee each voter’s right to a secret ballot, free from coercion or 
undue influence, and thus provide a predicate for giving the nonpartisan 
election commission authority to take steps to reduce the risk of absentee 
ballot improprieties. Likewise, the commission could have the power to 
adopt voter registration rules and voter identification procedures that 
collectively provide a reasonable effort at assuring that all eligible voters, 
but only eligible voters, have a fair opportunity to cast a ballot in each 
election. 
F. The Role of the United States Senate in Enacting National Legislation 
Turning to a potentially much more controversial topic, but one that 
deserve a place on the Posterity College’s agenda, the question arises of 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Is The Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 144-46 (2008); see also Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to 
Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234762. 
 36. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End the Voting Wars: Take Our Elections Out of the 
Hands of the Partisan and the Incompetent, SLATE: THE HIVE (June 13, 2012, 6:09 PM), 
http://hive. slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/end-the-voting-wars; see also 
Heather Gerken, The Missing Right to Vote: What We’d Get from Amending the Constitution 
to Guarantee It, SLATE: THE HIVE (June 13, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://hive.slate.com/hive/ 
how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-missing-right-to-vote. 
 37. See WHY TUESDAY?, http://www.whytuesday.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013); see 
also 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2012); 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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how much power the United States Senate should have to defeat legislation 
supported by both the House of Representatives and the President, given 
how geographically skewed the Senate is in favor of less populous states. 
As Adam Liptak recently observed in The New York Times, this geographic 
skew is much greater today than it was at the time the Constitution was 
originally adopted, and of course the nation is much more economically and 
culturally integrated than it was back then.38 Thus, it is reasonable to ask 
whether fifty years from now the small states should still be able to use 
their power in the Senate to block legislation supported by a large majority 
of the American people, as represented both by the House and the 
President. 
It is true that the small states cannot be denied their “equal suffrage” in 
the Senate—not even by a constitutional amendment. As Article V of the 
Constitution explicitly stipulates, each State must be willing to give up its 
equal voting power in the Senate in order to change the Constitution in this 
way.39 But Wyoming or Alaska is unlikely to agree to give up this power, 
and thus there is no point in the Posterity College attempting to propose a 
constitutional amendment to achieve this result. 
But instead, without depriving any state of its two Senators, what if the 
Constitution was amended to change the role that the Senate plays in the 
process of adopting national legislation? I do not think the role of the 
Senate could, or should, be eliminated completely. In other words, I do not 
think the Senate could, or should, become merely advisory. But suppose a 
proposed constitutional amendment would provide that a bill could become 
law, without an affirmative majority of the Senate, if passed by two-thirds 
of the House of Representatives and signed by the President—unless, 
within ten days of receiving the President’s signature, two-thirds of the 
Senate voted against the bill, in which case it would not become law. 
Although this proposal would significantly change the role that the Senate 
plays in the adoption of national legislation—giving the House and 
President the opportunity to pass a law without Senate approval—the 
proposal would not be so fundamentally out of step with the overall design 
of the original Constitution, including Article V, that the Supreme Court 
should feel authorized to invalidate this constitutional amendment even if it 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate, N. Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/11/us/politics/democracy-tested.html (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
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were approved by two-thirds of each house and three-fourths of the state 
legislatures. 
Consequently, I think the Posterity College would be warranted in taking 
up consideration of this, or some similar measure, designed to alter—but 
not abolish—the role of the Senate in national government for the sake of 
the future. 
G. Campaign Finance 
Also extremely controversial, and unlikely to win the necessary 
bipartisan support to achieve adoption by the Posterity College (much less 
the process for securing a constitutional amendment) even considering that 
implementation would be delayed for fifty years, would be any attempt to 
overturn Citizens United and other interpretations of the First Amendment 
that protect campaign spending from government regulation.40 Supporters 
of Citizens United think that the First Amendment principles on which it 
and related decisions are based reflect timeless verities and are not merely 
transient rulings to be repudiated subsequently.41 A better strategy would be 
to advocate that the Posterity College recommend a proposal for some 
novel approach to public financing of presidential and congressional 
campaigns without prohibiting ancillary private financing. For example, the 
idea of a voucher that citizens could use to support the candidates of their 
choice would be a decentralized mechanism that could provide seed capital 
for candidates attempting to get off the ground.42 Such an approach might 
be able to win over enough libertarians and conservatives concerned that 
the electoral process always remains appropriately competitive, even a half-
century or more into the future. 
H. Fixed Terms for Supreme Court Justices 
Linda Greenhouse has written that, despite her initial instincts, she favors 
a constitutional amendment that would fix the tenure of each Supreme 
Court Justice to a single eighteen-year term.43 I share her sentiment, and for 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010). 
 41. Bradley A. Smith, Newsflash: First Amendment Upheld, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2010, 
6:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045097045750191121729316 
20.html. 
 42. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice 
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1996); cf. Edward B. 
Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1994). 
 43. Linda Greenhouse, The 18-Year Bench, SLATE: THE HIVE (June 7, 2012, 10:08 PM), 
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the same reason: the replacement of Justices with new appointees should be 
more predictable and not so susceptible to strategic calculations.44 True, a 
Justice might be tempted to resign after only fifteen years, rather than 
serving the full eighteen, if the Justice fears that the next presidential 
election will be won by an objectionable candidate. But that temptation 
could be averted by a rule providing that vacancies prior to the completion 
of a full term will be filled by temporary replacements entitled to serve only 
for the remainder of the uncompleted term. Rather than guessing when each 
Justice will leave the Court, it would be better to know that each President 
could be expected to appoint two new Justices during each four-year 
presidential term. 
While contemplating this possible change, the Posterity College should 
also consider whether each Supreme Court appointment should require a 
two-thirds confirmation vote of the Senate. Presently, the risk of a filibuster 
hangs over a nominee, along with the debate about whether a filibuster 
would be procedurally appropriate (and, if so, according to what standard). 
A two-thirds confirmation requirement would reflect a constitutional 
judgment that Supreme Court nominees should be acceptable to both major 
political parties (or at least a wide swath of public opinion, in those rare 
circumstances in which one of the two major parties has become so 
uncompetitive to hold fewer than one-third of the seats in the Senate). Over 
time, constitutional law likely would become more moderate and stable, 
with major precedents less subject to frequent overrulings as currently 
occurs when the composition of the Court lurches back and forth between 
the control of one side or the other. 
I. Changing the Procedures for Constitutional Amendments 
One of the most useful functions the Posterity College could serve would 
be to recommend a constitutional amendment that would update the 
procedures for adopting new constitutional amendments. No one should 
want the process to become too easy; but it is reasonable to ask whether the 
process has become too difficult. Although the nation is governed by the 
same requirements as those set forth in the original Constitution, securing 
ratification of thirty-eight states is procedurally more burdensome than 
securing the ratification of ten. 
Without eliminating the current methods of amending the Constitution, it 
would be possible to add a new method. For example, Congress could be 
entitled to put a national referendum on the ballot. Perhaps it should take a 
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two-thirds vote of the entire national electorate for the provisions presented 
in such a referendum to be added to the Constitution. Or, as some have 
suggested, perhaps it should be necessary for the electorate to approve the 
same referendum in two successive presidential elections, in order to 
demonstrate persistent (and not merely fleeting) support for the measure.45 
Alternatively, there could be some complicated formula to require that 
enough voters in enough states approve the measure so that (for example) 
large populations on both coasts do not override the legitimate interests of 
the more sparely populated Great Plains and Mountain states. The Posterity 
College could constructively deliberate the pros and cons of these various 
alternatives and make whatever recommendation it thinks best for the long-
term future of the nation.46 
III. Some Concluding Observations 
It is possible that the Posterity College could recommend congressional 
statutes as well as constitutional amendments. But because none of its 
recommendations take effect for fifty years, it seems a little odd to enact an 
ordinary piece of statutory legislation that would wait a half-century before 
implementation. Rather, the whole concept of the Posterity Project is to 
consider fundamental long-term reforms designed to last for generations, 
and any such reform would be more suitable to adopt as a constitutional 
amendment; this is true even if Congress would be empowered to enact the 
same reform by means of a conventional statute. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 415 (1998). 
 46. Once one of the Posterity College’s proposals is adopted by a constitutional 
amendment according to the current requirements of Article V, it could not be undone by an 
ordinary act of Congress even during the fifty-year period prior to its taking effect. See U.S. 
CONST. art. V. Instead, a new constitutional amendment would be necessary to repeal the 
Posterity College’s adopted proposal. This necessity would apply even if, forty years down 
the road, a large number of Americans did not want the proposal to take effect in ten years. 
But in this respect the Posterity College’s proposals would be no different than any other 
constitutional amendment under the current rules of Article V. Moreover, if the Posterity 
College were successful in recommending a less rigorous method of constitutional 
amendment, once that proposal goes into effect fifty years into the future, then opponents of 
any other of the Posterity College’s adopted proposals could take advantage of the more 
lenient method in an effort to undo it. (Obviously, any of the Posterity College’s proposals 
that are subsequently determined to be misguided by an overwhelming consensus of public 
opinion, in light of changed circumstances fifty years into the future, could be undone even 
with the currently rigorous method of constitutional amendment—in the same way that 
Prohibition was repealed once it was widely seen as misguided. See id. amend. XXI, § 1.) 
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But if the Posterity College is to confine itself to recommending 
constitutional amendments, why not just make it a constitutional convention 
under Article V, and have its recommendations sent directly to the States 
for ratification (rather than requiring them to be approved by two-thirds of 
the Senate and the House before sending them to the States)? This 
alternative approach would be possible under Article V, provided that two-
thirds of the state legislatures called for the creation of a Posterity 
Convention.47 
But this alternative approach raises potential issues that likely are more 
trouble than they are worth. For one thing, would it be possible to organize 
the convention-calling process under Article V to establish in advance that 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush would serve as co-chairs of the 
convention? Likewise, would it be possible under Article V that the 
members of the convention would be appointed by these two co-chairs, or 
even appointed by Congress, rather than elected by the populace in some 
manner? Similarly, once a convention was established, would it be possible 
to confine its function to proposing amendments that would not take effect 
for fifty years after ratification? Instead, would not a convention established 
under the method set forth in Article V feel entitled to propose amendments 
to take effect immediately, thereby clouding the distinctive purpose of the 
Posterity Project and arguably undermining the spirit of the enterprise (an 
agreement to consider in good faith proposals to be adopted much later in 
the future, in exchange for a refusal to attempt to implement any of the 
proposed changes immediately)? Since the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787 itself transgressed its original charter, which was merely to propose 
amendments to the Articles of Confederation, Americans are 
understandably wary of the idea of calling another constitutional 
convention—for fear that it, too, would become a runaway enterprise 
exceeding its original mandate. 
Consequently, it seems safer and simpler to establish the Posterity 
College as an advisory body to Congress, which would retain the power 
under Article V to turn the Posterity College’s recommendations into 
official constitutional amendments to be sent to the States for ratification. If 
Congress refused to adopt the Posterity College’s recommendations, 
perhaps there would be impetus to call a constitutional convention in order 
to bypass Congress’s recalcitrance. But it seems that first it would be worth 
giving Congress a chance to send to the States whatever recommendations 
the Posterity College, through its well-structured process, developed. 
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Conversely, just because a particular proposal was recommended by the 
Posterity College would not preclude it being considered for immediate 
adoption pursuant to a different process. In other words, suppose 
redistricting reform was recommended by the Posterity College, and a 
constitutional amendment was ratified that would implement this 
recommendation a half-century later. Imagine, then, that a decade into this 
fifty-year wait Congress decided to send to the States a new constitutional 
amendment that would adopt the same redistricting reform immediately. 
That option would be legally available. The Posterity Project thus does not 
preclude other avenues of constitutional reform. Rather, it is simply a 
separate mechanism altogether. But it is a mechanism worth trying because 
the conventional means of constitutional reform have not shown themselves 
to be efficacious recently. 
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